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Abstract

The past decade has witnessed a dramatic growth in the number of wireless technologies. In
parallel, the liberalisation of telecommunications markets has led to an increasingly complex
set of issues to be dealt with by a growing number of actors. A direct consequence has been
the added difficulty in forecasting the market evolution of a particular wireless technology
and of the wireless industry as a whole.
China’s wireless industry has undergone such transformation in a short time and on a large
scale. With more than 200m subscribers, or 20% of the world total, the country has become
the largest market for mobile telephony. Since the mid-90’s China has moved from the status
of “follower” to being close to the forefront of wireless markets development. This shift
confronts all the wireless industry’s actors, from government to manufacturers, with more
uncertainty as to the evolution of the industry.
Like in other countries, operators tend to dominate the wireless industry in China. Whether
this supremacy is bound to last in light of the industry’s continuous transformation is
uncertain. Based on interviews we conducted in China, this paper presents a first assessment
of the Chinese broadband wireless industry, its main actors, and the major issues they will
face in the future. The last section maps out a number of scenarios for the future of the
broadband wireless industry in China.
Keywords: Telecommunication, Wireless, Scenario planning

1. Introduction
By the summer of 2001, the size of the subscriber base in China exceeded that of the US for
the first time (Steinbock 2003) making, with around 200m subscribers (or 20% of the world
total), China the largest market for mobile telephones. The gap between mobile phone users
and fixed-line ones has been widened to 5.39 million by the end of 2003, after the former
caught up with the latter in October and projections for end of 2004 are around 329 million
users1. Like other markets (Maitland et al. 2002), China’s mobile industry is undergoing a
rapid transformation of its value chain and industry structures.
Is it possible to assess and forecast the evolution of the wireless industry in China? A large
body of literature has been devoted to the field of technological forecasting. Martino
classifies the variety of approaches into environmental scanning, models, scenarios, Delphi2,

1 By January 2004 there were 268.9 million fixed lines vs. 276.8 million mobile subscribers and MII has issued
a goal of adding 52 million mobile phone users in 2004 (Ministry of Information Industry, 2004)
2
Delphi is used to integrate technology forecasting and assessment for comprehensive understanding of
emerging technologies Kameoka, A., Yokoo, Y., and Kuwahara, T. "A challenge of integrating technology
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extrapolation, probabilistic forecasts, technology measurement and some chaos-like
behaviour in technological data (Martino 2003). Additional approaches such as foresight can
be found in Grupp and Linstone (1999). In the field of telecommunications, most forecasting
work deals with telecommunication demand. McBurney et al. (2002) divide demand forecasts
into exploratory methods and primary market research techniques. Recognising the value of
holistic approaches Cracknell et al. (1999) describe an econometric model that retains the
traditional strengths of “whole market” models. Some recent work has been devoted to
forecasting demand in the mobile industry using models (Kumar et al. 2002).
Prospective is another way to deal with the assessment of possible futures. Scenarios take
into account the uncertainties in the driving forces by outlining different possible futures,
each resulting from different outcomes for important parameters, economic and social factors,
and political and policy actions. As pictures of what the future might look like if different
developments come to pass, rather than projections or forecasts, scenarios can be a useful
planning tool to guide the actions of individuals and organizations to meet a variety of
contingencies (Schwartz 1996).
The goal of this paper is to assess the Chinese wireless industry and to analyze the main
issues the stakeholders will face in the medium-term future. The next section is a broad
overview of the wireless industry in China. Section 3 scans the Chinese wireless broadband
landscape for actors and identifies the principal ones. Based on interviews we conducted with
some of those major actors, Section 4 discusses some of the main issues (regulatory,
technological and market uncertainty) they perceive as well as their position on those issues.
Building on this actor-issue matrix, the conclusion section introduces 3 medium-term
scenarios for the development of China’s broadband wireless industry.

2. The wireless industry in China
This section presents the market structure, the technological landscape and the policy-making
environment of the Chinese wireless industry in 2003.
2.1 Market structure
China’s mobile services sector currently operates as an imperfect duopoly with on one side
China Mobile (circa 70% of subscribers) and on the other side China Unicom. Despite largescale investments made by the latter, the market power rests, for the time being, in the hands
of China Mobile. Moreover, with China’s progressive WTO commitments for market access,
sizeable foreign entry into the mobile services market will remain limited for some time.
Thus, China’s mobile market structure reveals similarities with many other countries: an
incumbent (China Mobile) spun off from the fixed-line monopolist who maintained its initial
advantage to dominate the market.
One of the notable differences is the linkage that the operators have kept with the government.
Although the trend of separation of enterprise and government (zhengqi fenkai) is well
underway, the organizational boundaries between the operators and the government are much

foresight and assessment in industrial strategy development and policymaking," Technological Forecasting and
Social Change (71:6), 2004, pp. 579-598. One issue is whether Delphi methods apply well to technology
development in developing countries since their application has so far been limited Chakravarti, A. K., Vasanta,
B., Krishnan, A. S. A., and Dubash, R. K. "Modified Delphi Methodology for Technology Forecasting Case
Study of Electronics and Information Technology in India," Technological Forecasting and Social Change
(58:1-2), 1998, pp. 155-165..
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less clear than in most other markets. A second difference is the lack of service integration.
Except for China Unicom and despite the inroads made by China Telecom and China Unicom
in wireless telephony via PAS and WLANs, operators were supposed to provide only one
type of service. The government has indicated its wish to drive the industry’s structure
toward integrated operators, i.e. allowing fixed-line operators to enter mobile and vice-versa.
But by-and-large, the wireless market structure is not expected to change until the attribution
of new mobile licenses at some point in time in 2004.
The landscape for manufacturers looks very different. More than 30 mobile phone producers,
domestic and foreign, battle for a share of the market. GSM terminal manufacturers, lead by
Motorola, Nokia tend to dominate the market but strong competition has started to emerge
from local manufacturers (TCL and Bird). CDMA handsets are mostly produced by Chinese
companies, with the exception of Motorola. Companies like Eastcom also emerge with the
ability to produce handsets, mobile switching equipment and mobile base stations.
Finally, most of the value-added service providers (VAS) are trying to refine their business
models. The current technological uncertainty, coupled with gloomy capital markets, has
hindered their development and except for a handful of companies (Sohu and Sina), valueadded service provision tends to remain small-scale operations.
2.2 Broadband wireless technological milestones and leapfrogging
The current variety of wireless technologies deployed in China tends to confirm the assertion
that the wireless future will include a mix of heterogeneous wireless access technologies
(Lehr et al. 2003). Launched in May 2002, 2.5G already created some changes is the
competitive position of the two operators in China because of differences in the underlying
technology used by each. With the introduction of 3G, competitive positions will probably
undergo another shift. However, China Mobile and Unicom are unlikely to be required to
launch competing 3G networks until early 2005. This leaves a full two years during which
2.5G will be the main battleground for the operators – probably longer than in other markets.
Personal Access Systems (PAS) have long remained in the regulatory gray area3. Following
several policy-making reversals, PAS seems finally to have been officially permitted to
operate nationwide 4 . Although it is not offering broadband wireless at the time, PAS
technology allows such a migration path. A more important aspect of PAS has been the role it
played in “disrupting” the industry albeit on the fringes (as mobile “test-bed" for fixed
operators and "troublemaker" for mobile operators). Indeed the success of PAS has initiated a
battle between fixed and mobile operators, which has forced the latter to resort to de facto
one-way billing to fend off PAS. In addition PAS raises the questions of how further open
mobile markets and encourage competition.
Another technology currently operating at the margin is the Wireless Local Access Network
(WLAN). With limited market for the time being, WLANs equally have a potential to disrupt
the mobile market. From the regulatory perspective, WLANs benefit from the same treatment

3

Personal Access System (PAS) or Xiaolingtong is a wireless technology allowing limited roaming but at the
cost of fixed telephony. PAS is essentially derived from PHS technology (Personal Handyphone System)
invented in Japan in the early 1990s for densely populated urban areas with restricted mobility.
4
In March 2003, PHS business was defined as supplement and extension of fixed-line phone business by
China's government. The move means that China's government eventually acknowledges the legitimacy of PHS
business (SinoCast "PHS Business Should Stick to Low-price Guideline," 2004b.)
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as other parts of the world: it is currently un-regulated. This status can be attributed to the
emerging nature of the technology (not yet on the regulator’s radar screen) rather than a
positive decision from the Chinese regulator to leave WLANs outside of its regulatory scope5.
Here several questions are raised: is the regulator more interested in content than conduit?
China is still considering which of the new third-generation (3G) technologies it will adopt as
the national standard. It is currently studying wideband-code division multiple access (WCDMA - a GSM development) and CDMA2000 (the US variant), as well as home-grown TSCDMA, which has been developed by the China Academy of Telecommunications
Technology and Siemens. There is lack of decision-making from all the various stakeholders,
that is the government through its Ministry of Information Industry (MII) and the major
network operators China Mobile and China Unicom. The situation looks like a Catch 22:
network operators don’t want to roll out 3G networks before the government has announced
one or several standard(s), while the government waits for domestic and international
equipment manufacturers to complete the testing process. These intense technological
dynamics are perturbing the classical liberalization course of fixed telephony markets
followed in most national policies and putting governments in front of new regulatory and
policy-making challenges (Arnbak 2000).
2.3 Policy-making environment
Most authors (Dai 2002; Fan 1996; Lovelock et al. 2000; Ure 1994) highlight the unicity of
China’s telecommunication experience (size, scale and speed of network development,
location focus and no limitation to traditional telecommunication infrastructure) while
concluding that the policy process has been a fairly consistent and interactive one. Drawing
on institutional theory and bargaining theory, Zhang (2001) analyzes the policy-making
mechanism stressing the important role played by informal institutions in shaping China’s
telecommunications policy-making. He however concludes that telecommunication policy
tends to be inconsistent and uncertain and that policy implementation is accompanied with
deflection and inconsistency. Lovelock et al. (2000) offer an alternative to existing studies on
Chinese telecommunications that focused on technical/industrial studies, descriptive accounts
or prospect for liberalization analyses and largely neglected the process of policy-making,
arguing that central control in China telecommunications policy-making has remained
impressively consistent. The government’s role has indeed remained paramount during the
initial phases of industrial development.
Telecommunication reforms has been particularly complex due to several factors, including
weak horizontal linkages among ministries, China’s keen interest in content regulation and
surveillance, and the distribution of regulatory responsibilities among Party and government
actors (DeWoskin 2001). Overall, the sector remains one of the least liberalized in Asia and
is relatively closed to foreign participation. However, to stimulate consumer demand and
sustain levels of private sector investment, the relaxation of controls and establishment of a
clear regulatory framework are becoming increasingly unavoidable. Moreover, commitments
made as part of China's pledge to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 should
engender significant revisions of the market, providing benefits for domestic and foreign

5

The disruptive nature of WLAN is exemplified by the recent issuing of standards forcing foreign
manufacturers to cooperate with domestic companies to produce WLAN equipment (SinoCast "China to Be
Determined to Implement Its Own WLAN Standard," Beijing, 2004a.)

1022

interests alike 6 . For Zhang (2001) the extent that the WTO can influence China’s
telecommunication policy-making and regulatory transition is still uncertain and depends on
whether China has an incentive and political will to fully implement the WTO principles. It is
very early to judge on the reach of the WTO concessions in telecommunications. However,
and despite many hurdles, China seems to have embraced the spirit of WTO-inspired
competitive environment and is shifting to global regulation norms in telecommunication.
The potential for far-reaching reform should not, however, be over-estimated. WTO reforms
may take several years to filter through, while entrenched, conservative elements in the
bureaucracy will continue to oppose any reforms that threaten to seriously undermine state
control.

3. Actors
Some authors have applied policy networks to telecommunications (Schneider et al. 1991)
focusing on actor configurations and institutional arrangements. In such an approach the
telecommunication sector is considered as a system of actors – an action domain – where
specific economic, technical and political interests are at stake, with resources are mobilized
and exchanged and where individual and collective strategies are pursued (Geray 1999). In
their work on globalisation of regulation, Braithwaite et al. (2000) focus on the way actors
have used mechanisms and principles to determine the shape of international
telecommunication regulations. Their analysis identifies five actors: companies, business
organizations, states, and organizations of states, NGOs and mass publics, and epistemic
communities of actors. Similarly, Pau identifies 7 basic categories: customers, operators,
equipment providers, VAS service providers, regulatory bodies and governments (Pau 2002).
In the case of China’s telecommunication, the issue of interplay has been addressed at the
government level by Lovelock (1999) with a bargaining framework that is employed in lieu
of a legislative framework and a mechanism for administrative co-ordination 7 . Further,
Mueller et al. use a game theory model to analyse the way four players (the Chinese state, the
Ministry of Information Industry/China Telecom, domestic rivals, and foreign strategic
investors) interacted over access to foreign capital and technology (Mueller et al. 2000).
3.1 Companies
An analysis of the value chain draws clear distinction between the various players, i.e.
equipment manufacturers, network operators and VAS providers. The former tend to fall less
under the scrutiny and management of the government. Several reasons explain this: the
equipment manufacturing industry has over the years achieved a relative maturity and
functions pretty much along the lines of a competitive market. While still falling under
production licensing processes and subject to the usual industrial planning guidelines as well
as periodic “buy local” campaigns, Chinese telecommunication manufacturers benefit from
relatively little direct government protection. Some of the international equipment
manufacturers have even started to view them over the past few years as their emerging rivals.
On the other side, the two major network operators operate for the time being under an
imperfect duopoly, with China Mobile claiming around 70% of the total subscribers. Despite

6

Although the WTO accession process is often considered as an important driver in the overall economic
reforms and in the opening of particular industries to foreign investment, the power of the Ministry of
Information Industry (MII) has somewhat limited the amount of concessions made during the accession.
7
The increasing freedom left to market players will probably require to shift the focus from the government to
the market.
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heavy investments, China Unicom remains at best a challenger. Unless privatization of
telecommunication assets takes place, which seems unlike for the time being despite the
partial listing of the two major operators on foreign stock exchanges, their role and salience
in the development of the industry will largely be dictated, directly and indirectly, by the
government.
3.2 Business associations
Domestic associations are often regarded as being mainly controlled by the government in an
attempt to show some public morality and are seen as a middle layer between the Ministry
and the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). In the field of wireless telecommunication many
activities previously conducted under MII are now the remit of industry associations but the
typical membership roster consists entirely of SOEs that are effectively compelled to join.
Thus, the emergence of business associations in China “with a voice of their own” is still
something quite nascent. Those associations can be divided in three: vendor-driven groups,
broad-based constituencies and foreign organizations. Vendor-driven groups, such as the TDSCDMA forum seem to be more focused. However, they lack credibility since they have
clear vested interests. Broad-based constituencies, such as the China Mobile Communication
Association (CMCA) are trying to bridge the various constituencies. However, one question
is whether such a bridge is feasible, i.e. whether operators, manufacturers and the regulator
can agree on substantial topics given that their interests often go in opposite directions.
Finally, foreign organizations, such as the United States Information Technology Office
(USITO), the American Chamber of Commerce or the E-commerce Working Group (ECWG)
are quite active and carry the lessons from previous experience in other international markets.
However, their voice might not always be heard by the decision-makers, despite attempts to
take as neutral an approach as possible and including domestic actors.
3.3 The State
Despite appearances, the Chinese State is not a monolith. Important players besides MII are
the State Council and the State Development and Reform Commission (SDRC)8. The most
important regulatory policies must gain support from SDRC and approval from the State
Council. Moreover, there are many interest groups with powerful bargaining power which
also impose significant influence on telecommunications regulation and policy (Zhang 2001).
Lovelock et al. offer a two-tier bargaining model that consists of a co-ordinated approach on
part of government and from a macro-policy perspective (Lovelock et al. 2000). In their
analysis the government has set forth a strategic initiative to build around facilitating reforms
without being bound to a single set strategy (attempt to regulate the process without being
restrictive, refusing to define where the boundary lines are) and it has tried to encompass and
co-ordinate participation.
In addition to the general policy-making process, one has to note the shift of centers of
powers within the State. A major milestone was the re-organisation of the industry in 1998
through the creation of the Ministry of Information Industry (MII). However, as market and
political reforms are carried on, there is a redistribution of tasks and functions at the
government level.
Until recently, China’s telecommunication industry was largely independent from external
“interference”. Since its accession to the WTO in November 2001, specific commitments

8

Previously known as the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC)
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have been negotiated leading to a gradual and limited opening of the telecommunication
services sector. In a nutshell, China has agreed to open the value-added services to foreign
investment through joint-ventures while keeping a firmer grasp on the mobile and fixed
services9.
3.4 NGOs and mass public
Ma (2002) questions whether autonomy is the most useful theoretical concept in our
understanding of what is happening in China and argues that instead of addressing how
illegitimate Chinese NGOs are for their lack of autonomy, we should understand how they
differ from governmental organizations and from their predecessors. “More and more
organizations, and industrial associations in particular, are acting like mediators and interest
groups. These associations have been important bridges between government and business.
Not only do they assist the former by implementing regulations and supervising proper
business behavior, they also furnish their members with information, technology, training and
many other services.”
After many decades of neglect, end-users are becoming more and more influential and
consumer rights lobbies have become more vocal and effective in mobilizing (for example,
the China Consumer Association has brought mobile handsets under the sanbao policy10).
While they still lack an in-depth understanding of the technology issues, operators have
realized that they have to develop more sophisticated marketing, to adjust strategies to meet
customer requirements and that the government can’t just make decisions that will go over
consumer interests.

4. Issues
The following section presents the issues perceived and the actors’ position on those issues.
The issues were grouped in three sets: market, technology and regulatory uncertainties.
4.1 Market uncertainty
Intellectual Property Right (IPR) - Historically, the mobile infrastructure technology in China
has come from Europe, USA and Japan. China has been a follower in adopting the
technology in its country and networks and had not much to say about IPR issues. With the
3G transition, IPR became an inherent part of strategy (Steinbock 2002). In the case of China,
technology-agnosticism to bargain the best terms could be a leading driver (Steinbock 2003).
The issue is further complicated by the current lack of recognition for IPRs in China.
Understandably operators don’t seem to care too much of IPR as long as it doesn’t slow down
the 3G standard decision. Finally, the Chinese government has the natural aim to increase
domestic IPR. However, it is faced with the dilemma of letting the market decide and
intervening to favour the domestic standard.
Imbalance and alignment of players in value chain - A variety of different factors have to
come together uniquely at the same time for something in the wireless broadband space to be
successful. As discussed above the dominance of operators, competition of manufacturers
and lack of value-added providers is currently stifling the value-chain. Despite heavy

9

While the WTO accession remains the major element of outside pressure, China takes part in other multilateral
initiatives, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and APEC TEL working groups.
10
The three guarantees: one week (return no questions asked, one month (return/trade in for equal value) and
one year (maintenance and repair).
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investments in China Unicom, the government has failed to create a competitive mobile
market for operators and China Mobile’s influence on the industry remains enormous.
Shift from voice to data - China is not immune from the worldwide trend of shift from voice
to data11. The government is concerned by the shift to data as this will transfer the problem of
information “control” from the Internet to the mobile industry. On the other side, and in light
of the decreasing ARPU in voice communications, operators are welcoming the additional
revenue stream. There is thus little doubt that the Chinese operators will cooperate with the
government like ISPs do.
In addition to those issues, actors identify additional issues: the emergence of new actors, the
partial listing of Chinese operators on foreign capital markets, the current gloom in capital
markets, decreasing ARPUs, and the lack of applications.
4.2 Technology uncertainty
At first, the debate around standardization comes across as pretty straightforward:
standardization can overcome many disadvantages related to a too wide variety of products,
services or methods. Without standardization, a battle between different technological
systems may emerge, and users may get stranded in technologies that will disappear from the
market after a while (Bekkers et al. 2002). However, Gandal et al. (2003) argue that whether
mandated standards have been more beneficial than standards determined by the market in
the case of wireless telecommunications depends upon several factors including whether
market competition led to technological improvements in wireless technology, whether
compatibility (standardization) matters for the adoption of wireless technologies, as well as
other regulatory decisions about factors such as calling party pays, roaming and call
termination.
Choice of standard - Backers of both 3G standards, each with strong political support, have
been furiously lobbying the Chinese government (which is expected to issue 3G licences in
2004) to bless their particular technology. To complicate matters further, however, a third
contender has entered the field: China's home- grown 3G standard, called TD-SCDMA.
Despite a relatively strong government backing, TD-SCDMA is expected to play more of a
niche role. Thus standards and unique Chinese standards have become the issue. Both
operators and manufacturers fear that the government and its agencies are putting out
standards in sectors that “aren’t well thought out and are very costly since it is not business
people doing it but bureaucrats who think they what is good for China”. The government is
likely to choose the technologies that will generate best prospects for the equipment industry
in China. The government is expected to issue licenses based on both W-CDMA and
CDMA2000, so that China’s manufacturers can leverage the scale of the domestic market to
become global players. TD-SCDMA may have a small role, for example in limited franchise
areas, for the sake of national pride, but no nation-wide rollout.
Timing of standard - The issuing date of 3G licenses is yet undecided. Because the 3Goriented multimedia short messages market remains immature experts believe that 3G

11

In January 2004, more than 15 billion SMS were sent (Ministry of Information Industry)

1026

licenses should issue at some point in 2004 but this will depend on the State Council's
decision12.
Locus of decision - Stigler’s central thesis was that as a rule, regulation is acquired by the
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit (Stigler 1971). In the case of
wireless broadband a shared view is that the market will see some government “guidance” in
deciding which technology operators apply in rolling out their networks.
4.3 Regulatory and policy uncertainty
As analyzed by McCarty (1992), there is a good case to be made that a “feedback loop”
between regulatory proceedings, processes, and telecommunication infrastructure can also
apply to China. In a broad sense, China’s most pressing regulatory issues remain the absence
of an official telecommunications law, interconnection regimes to sustain fair competition,
the establishment of a Universal Service Obligation (USO) policy and the issuing of 3G
mobile licenses.
The confluence of regulated and unregulated markets poses dilemmas in deciding on issues
of open access to the new opportunities for competitive providers and/or consumers (Arnbak
2000). Bourreau et al. (2001) point out the duality of regulatory policies: if regulatory
authorities cannot respond fast enough to follow the rapid change of the market, many
regulatory measures then become either inefficient or obsolete. On the other hand, due to
endogenous relationship between technological progress and industry structure, regulatory
policies affect the speed of technological change in return.
According to the economic theory of regulation, there is a balancing of interest group
strength and weaknesses at the margin, with the outcome determined by the stake that the
various groups have in it and the efficiency by which they can influence the regulatory
process (Wenders 1988).
As described above, telecommunications policy-making is rather complex in China. Although
the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) nominally is in charge of the telecommunications
policy-making, there are actually more players involved in the process. On the one hand, the
State Council and the National People’s Congress13 draw and enact formal institutions in the
forms of rules, orders, and decisions. These formal institutions are mandatory and binding for
MII while formulating the telecommunications policy. On the other hand, the interest parties
and public opinion representing the informal institutions also play an influential role of
shaping the telecommunications policy, mainly through bargaining with the formal
institutions.
Role of government/regulator - Across actors, it is recognized that there is a need for a much
more focused role of the regulator, whose task would be to concentrate on the regulations of
the telecommunication service market: market regulations, interconnection, universal service
obligations (USO), telecommunication resources, licensing and other important issues.

12

An executive of the Management Bureau of Radio Frequency says the bureau need to allocate the frequency
carefully, if the State Government issued 3G licenses in the near future, but up to now, the bureau has not been
informed on this issue.
13
And to a certain extent the Communist Party
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Transparency - Despite notable improvements, the lack of transparency and associated
uncertainty remains an issue, at least for foreign operators. Solving the issue of transparency
won’t be easy. By the nature of the industry, telecommunication companies and operators are
not necessarily interested in a consensus action. Efforts by business associations like the
American Chamber of Commerce’s white paper are important effort but they too often are the
result not of the companies themselves but of the experts, consultants and advisors who know
the issues just as well and put together the concerns.
In addition general issues of transparency (like licensing processes) are going to be brought
through the WTO, instead of the traditional route via the MII. Such forum/regime shifting
will probably delay the issue of transparency for international actors since they will have to
establish different contact channels. Finally one can mention that while major foreign
equipment vendors or operators see the lack of transparency has a major issue, smaller
players see it as a god sent: they thrive on this lack of transparency.
Implementation of regulations - Major uncertainty lies in the implementation of regulations.
For example, the implementation of regulations for the foreign investment provisions,
certainty about the final shape of the major telecommunication assets, the move to a
telecommunication law and to see at a practical level some precedents and examples of
investments and partnerships that work.

5. Conclusion
Based on the assessment of the broadband wireless industry in China, its main stakeholders,
and the issues analyzed during the interviews we conducted, further research has to be done
for validating the assumption that the three following scenarios describe possible futures for
the wireless industry in China.
5.1 Techno-nationalism and the public good – Regulation rules
In this scenario the government maintains its central role and attempts to dictate the
development of the industry to the other actors by various means. To put it differently,
“standards and unique Chinese standards are the issue”14. The recent dispute between the
China and the USA on Wireless LAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI)
illustrates the scenario15 . While China has recently agreed to delay indefinitely a plan to
impose a security standard for wireless communications, it took a very high-level of
intervention between both countries. While the regulators are clearly aware of technological
trends and making decisions on standards after watching what has happened in foreign
markets16, a tendency to intervene remains. Increased government involvement, through the
Ministry of Information Industry or the Leading Group on Informatisation, entails a
diminished room to maneuver both for operators and equipment manufacturers. Except in the
case of government-led technological investments, the scenario also implies a reduced
incentive to innovate as market-players suffer from regulatory uncertainty.

14

Interview with author, Beijing. June 10 2002
The Chinese government has clarified that the proposed standard took the “Regulations for the Administration
of Commercial Encryption” as its legal basis, which legislation was promulgated by the State Council on 7
October 1999. These regulations prohibit the use of foreign encryption technology in commercial applications in
China.
16
Interview with author, Beijing, September 3 2001
15
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5.2 Level playing field – Market rules
In this scenario, operators and equipment manufacturers take a pro-active stance. Although
the influence of various associations remains limited, their existence indicates a desire from
the market to take part in the industrial development. In addition, the objective to breed
national champions with a capacity to gain global market shares will require the government
to leave companies gain a competitive edge at home. The implication for actors is, and for the
time being, power with the incumbent operators. Compliance with WTO commitments and
further liberalisation of the telecommunication sector may nevertheless re-define the
landscape through the emergence of additional operators
5.3 Techno-fetichism – Technology rules
In this scenario, continuous emergence of alternative technologies threatens the government’s
attempt to regulate and redistribute the strength of players in the value chain. As noted by
Lehr et al., WiFi wireless access can emerge in a decentralized, bottom–up fashion (although
it is also possible for this to be centrally coordinated and driven by a wireline or mobile
service provider). While the prevailing business model for 3G services and infrastructure is
vertically integrated, this need not be the case for WiFi (Lehr et al. 2003). The implications
for actors are emergence of other/new operators, a diminished role for government and
regulators and the creation of new alliances17. In turn, this might lead to a shift of IPR from
manufacturers to content providers. In terms of usage, this scenario implies a diversification
of access devices (such as heterogeneous PAS/WLAN devices).
The only certainty is that the future of the industry will be made of a mix between regulations,
market and technology forces. Despite their shortcomings the scenarios presented offer a
departure point to map the development of China’s broadband wireless industry. The
approach may be useful both to market players and the government in their efforts to identify
the key issues at stake and influence the industry’s development.

17

Korea, Japan and China are said to spend over $250 Million on 4G technologies and services
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